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Planning for Science and Technology in China and India1 
 
Jahnavi Phalkey, King’s College London 
Zuoyue Wang, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona 
 
 
Abstract 
Planning for science and technology was a global phenomenon in the mid-twentieth 
century. A few countries drew up comprehensive five-year plans adapting from the 
Soviet model: China and India were two new developing countries to do so. In this 
paper we examine the early efforts at national planning for science and technology as 
seen in the Chinese twelve-year science and technology (1956-68) and the five-year 
science and technology plan of India (1974-79). These are two historically distinct 
moments globally and two separate attempts specifically. What tie them together are 
the goals both sought to accomplish: of science and technology led industrialisation 
and development, many a times in comparison and sometimes in competition with 
each other. We show that these two incomplete exercises show us the complex 
histories of institutions and processes that confirm state-led faith in and engagement 
with science and technology. 
 
 
 
In late 1954, John Desmond Bernal, the British physicist and Marxist, was invited to 
Beijing by the Chinese Academy of Sciences to participate in the 5th anniversary of 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and to conduct an extensive review of 
its scientific institutions. There, amidst the festivities, he met Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru of India, whom he had known from the latter’s Cambridge days and 
who now invited him to revisit India to review its scientific progress. Inevitably, he 
was asked to compare the status of science in the two major Asian neighbours at the 
end of his stay in India. “Science progress in India, though good, was not fast enough 
as compared to China,” he ventured. Was it due to the different political systems? 
Bernal thought not completely: both had mixed economies but in China the 
government was in control while it was not clear who was in control in India.2 Four 
years later, Bernal might have noticed that within the space of a few months, two 
visions for science and technology-driven development found expressions in both 
India and China. On March 4, 1958, the Indian government under Nehru passed a 
“Science Policy Resolution” which called for the modernization of science, 
technology, and education in India. Specifically, it foresaw the possibility that 
enhanced scientific training could lead to the build-up of “skills which can be 
exported in return for raw materials.”3 Three months later, on June 3, 1958, the 
official newspaper of Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party under 
Chairman Mao Zedong published an editorial on its front page entitled “March on a 																																																								
1 We want to thank Jon Agar, Jennifer Altehenger, Sabine Clarke, Valeska Huber, Cathryn Johnston, 
John Krige, Roland Wittje, and the two referees for their comments on this paper. We are grateful to 
our colleagues in the Intersections/ ReFocus group, especially Sigrid Schmalzer, Arunabh Ghosh, and 
Jon Wilson for their generous engagement with our project. 
2 Andrew Brown, J. D. Bernal: The Sage of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 392-399, 
quote on 399. 
3 “Science Policy Resolution 1958,” accessed at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130116025514/http://dst.gov.in/stsysindia/spr1958.htm in February 
2016.  
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Technological Revolution.” It stated that the Chinese revolution had entered “a new 
historical epoch” marked by “a technological revolution and cultural revolution.” It 
called for the building of “a great socialist country with modern industry, agriculture, 
and science and culture,” and the editorial envisioned an industrialized China “with 
chimneys of factories dotting towns and cities, big and small, all over the country.”4 
 
In this paper we examine the early efforts at national planning for science and 
technology that were closely connected with these policy pronouncements in 1958 in 
India and the PRC: the series of Chinese national science and technology plans 
starting with the Chinese twelve-year science and technology plan formulated in 1956 
and the lead up to the five-year science and technology plan of India launched in 
1973. These are two historically distinct moments globally and two separate attempts 
specifically. What tie them together are the goals both sought to accomplish: of 
science and technology led industrialisation and development, many a times in 
comparison and sometimes in competition with each other. By the end, we hope to 
show the merits in juxtaposing these two incomplete exercises to understand the 
complex histories of the state-led faith in and engagement with science and 
technology in the two countries. As Bernal implied, India and China shared both 
obvious similarities—large populations, rich pasts, and developmental aspirations—
but also dramatic differences, especially in terms of their political systems and their 
geopolitical international environments during the Cold War. Widely recognized as 
two rising powers in science, technology, and economy challenging the dominance of 
the United States and Europe in these areas in the twenty-first century, it is important 
to better understand their historical trajectories that linked their science-planning and 
other early nation-building programs to their progress in recent years.5 Together it is 
hoped that such comparative studies would enrich our vocabulary in history of 
science and technology, in the history of development, and extend our archives for 
Cold War history as well as twentieth century transnational history. 
 
War, Independence, and Planning in India 
There was a rather long lead into the first (and only) science and technology plan in 
India formulated in 1973. Given the discussions on the place of science in nation 
building at Independence, and the energetic pursuit of planning otherwise, one could 
argue, that the science and technology plan perhaps came much later than one could 
have expected.6 While there is no easy explanation for this delay, the process leading 
up the plan nonetheless is interesting and suggests some clarifications that require 
further study. The plan’s implementation was to fall under a period of deep political 
turmoil and discontinuity and is illustrative of the deep divisions in the thinking on 
science and technology in India after independence. 
 																																																								
4 “Xiang jishu geming jinjun” (march on a technological revolution), Renmin ribao (people’s daily), 
June 3, 1958, p. 1. 
5 For a recent discussion of the rise of India and China in the context of international science, see, e.g., 
Jon Agar, Science in the Twentieth Century and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 509-516.  
6 See Robert S. Anderson’s comprehensive mapping of the science establishment in India in Nucleus 
and Nation: Scientists, International Networks and Power in India (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
2010); see also the last chapters in Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of 
Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and David Arnold Science, Technology 
and Medicine in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For planning and 
development, see Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India: A Social and Intellectual History- 1930-1950 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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The debate on state-led organisation of science and technology began in earnest in 
late-imperial India. The National Institute of Sciences of India (NISI) met in Calcutta 
during WWII (1943) to discuss the following questions: “how should the war time 
infrastructure in science and technology be assimilated for peace time civil 
organisation; what should be the organisational model for science and technology 
adopted for post-war and independent India; and how should India benefit from the 
Commonwealth structure?” The NISI suggestion was to have a central organisation 
only for the disbursement of research grants but not to set research priorities. Around 
the same time, the British physiologist and Secretary of the Royal Society, Archibald 
Vivian Hill, visited India with the view to bring Indian science and technology into 
the war effort. In his report at the end of the visit the following year, he suggested – in 
contrast to NISI - a centralized state-led organisation of science and engineering 
research (1944).7 Bracketing these two hotly debated proposals were the Indian 
National Congress led National Planning Committee (1938) on the one end, and at the 
other, Vannevar Bush’s Science, the Endless Frontier (1945), both seen as events of 
significant importance by the Indian science community.8 
 
Planning for the coordination of research and development of natural resources was 
not a new idea in India in 1945. It had been under work for the previous seven years 
in two ways. Following the Government of India Act (1935) that allowed for 
provincial autonomy on the Indian sub-continent, the newly elected provincial 
government led mainly by the Indian National Congress established a National 
Planning Committee constituted by 24 sub-committees (NPC, 1938).9 The Soviet 
Experiment, Meiji Japan, and the American New Deal were looked at as 
accomplishments of planning. The physicist Meghnad Saha hoped that the NPC 
should provide for India something like Sun Yat Sen’s San Min Chin (Three 
Principles of the People) in China.10 Saha believed that Sun Yat Sen had replaced 
Confucius in the minds of the Chinese masses, and even if it was only partially 
successful, this had strengthened their resistance to Japan. 
Even though the NPC significantly drew upon the energies of scientists and engineers, 
it is now seen as a precursor to the Planning Commission of India (est. 1950) more 
than it is to any science plan. The roots of this development may partially lie in the 
scientists’ perception of their role in planning: Meghnad Saha summarised the 
representation of the National Institute of Sciences of India to the NPC: 
 																																																								
7 Jagdish Sinha, Science, War and Imperialism: India in the Second World War Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 
52-53; and Phalkey (2013), pp. 61-64. 
8 Jahnavi Phalkey, Atomic State: Big Science in Twentieth Century, India Delhi: Permanent Black, 
2013, pp. 66-76. 
9 The National Planning Committee was constituted of 24 sub-committees on Rural Marketing and 
Finance; River Training and Irrigation; Soil Conservation and Afforestation; Land Policy, Agricultural 
Labour and Insurance; Animal Husbandry & Dairying, Horticulture and Fisheries; Crops – Planning 
and Production; Rural and Cottage Industries; Power and Fuel; Chemical Industries; Mining and 
Metallurgical Industries; Manufacturing Industries; Industries connected with Scientific Instruments 
and Engineering Industries;  Labour, Population;  Trade – Internal and Foreign;  Public and Industrial 
Finance;  Currency Exchange and Banking;  Insurance – individual and social; Transport – Road, Rail, 
Air and Water; Communications – Posts,  Telegraphs, Telephones,  and Radio;  National Housing; 
Public Health; Education – General and Technical; and, finally, Women’s Role in the Planned 
Economy. 
10 Meghnad Saha to Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 October 1938, Saha Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and 
Library. 
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“In the representation from the National Institute of Sciences we have 
therefore insisted on the necessity of separation of the two functions: of 
the industrial and scientific research and of industrial planning and 
development. I, as a scientific man, do not wish to take upon myself the 
responsibilities for which I am not fitted. Let it be thrown on the political 
and industrial leaders.”11 
 
With the outbreak of war and the intensification of the demand for self-rule, part of 
the Congress leadership was in prison. As a result, the work of the NPC was slowed 
down. However, planning towards the war-effort – that Archibald Hill had set in 
motion - would soon begin to absorb the capacities of a section of the scientists and 
engineers involved with the NPC. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR, 1942) was established with the intensification of war effort on the Eastern 
Front to include industrialists – like the Tata House, scientists and engineers, and 
bureaucrats of Empire. A couple of years later, an Industrial Research Planning 
Committee (1944) was created with only Indian scientists, engineers and industrialists 
which was unlike the previous boards and committees whose members were primarily 
British.12 These structures established for war-effort became the institutions and 
mechanisms to inform and shape free India’s science and engineering infrastructure 
and, eventually, the first science plan - but that would come only two and a half 
decades later. 
 
The National Institute of Sciences of India recommended, in 1943, the establishment 
of a National Research Council “outside the control of official government machinery 
but accountable to the Government of India”.13 The work of this council would be 
dominated by scientific institutions like the universities and research laboratories, “to 
plan the main lines of scientific work in accordance with national needs; to ensure 
balanced development of all branches of science, and prevent duplication; to advise 
relevant authorities regarding the training and supply of scientific personnel for pure 
and applied research”. Not all agreed. Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya  - briefly 
chairperson of the National Planning Committee - saw merit in the organisation of a 
National Council of Industrial Research instead of a general council co-ordinating 
scientific research.14 																																																								
11 Meghnad Saha to Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, 29 March 1940, Saha Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum 
and Library. 
12 Between July 1940 and December 1943, the following twenty committees were constituted under the 
CSIR: Glass and Refractories Committee; Electrochemical Industries Committee; Industrial 
Fermentation and Biological Products Committee; Dye-Stuffs Committee; Fuel Research Committee; 
Vegetable Oils Committee; Cellulose Research Committee; Heavy Chemicals and Chemical Industries 
Committee (including Fertilizers and Salts); Pharmaceuticals and Drugs Committee; Plastics 
Committee; Atmospheric Research Committee;  Essential Oils Committee;  Metals Committee;  
Internal Combustion Engines Research Committee;  Distillation and Other Chemical Plants 
Committee; Applied Physics Committee;  Radio Research Committee;  Statistics, Standards and 
Quality Control Committee;  Leather Research Committee;  Building Research Committee. 
13 Proceedings of the National Institute of Sciences of India X (1944), The volume contains papers 
from the symposium of September 27-28, 1943 held in Calcutta. See V. V. Krishna, S. S. Bhatnagar on 
Science, Technology and Development, 1938-54 (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Ltd, 1993), 13-15. 
14 NISI further suggested that the National Research Council be organised under four boards: Board of 
Scientific Research; Board of Agricultural Research; Board of Medical and Public Health Research; 
and Board of Engineering Research all of which would organise research committees in turn to inform 
research in the national laboratories. On Visvesvaraya, see (all by) Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya, - 
Reconstructing India (London: P. S. King & Son Ltd, 1920); -Planned Economy for India (Bangalore 
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Hill’s suggestion could not have been further from the recommendations of NISI. He 
suggested the establishment of a centralized Department of Planning and 
Development within the British Government of India that would co-ordinate all 
scientific and industrial research and concentrating within it all executive powers. Hill 
included the NISI suggestion for a National Research Council and its various boards, 
but this would not be an autonomous body as NISI had suggested. Shanti Swarup 
Bhatnagar, the physical chemist leading the wartime science effort in India, agreed 
with Hill’s suggestion. As a result, the wartime CSIR became the foundation for the 
organisation of science research in India after independence. There were 
disagreements among the Indian science community - but the disagreement was not 
centred on the idea of planning – it was instead focused on what kind of an 
organisation would draw up the plan for the futures of the national and university 
based laboratories. 
 
Vannevar Bush’s Endless Frontier was published about the same time as these 
debates were raging in India: this was – globally - the moment to dwell upon the 
nature of the relationship between science and the state after the scientific war-effort 
during WWII that had near-completely recast the terms on which this discussion 
could be conducted. Meghnad Saha had in fact met Bush in the United States (1944): 
“We met Dr Vannevar Bush, the erstwhile MIT electrical engineer, who handled the 
fine wartime organisation of scientists and technicians known as OSRD (Office of 
Scientific Research and Development), having a budget larger than that of peace-time 
Government of India”.15 In his continuing arguments about the organisation of 
science in free India, Saha referred in great detail to Bush’s report: … (where) the 
idea of a National Research Foundation was first broached, consisting of national-
official scientists with an elected chairman, which was to be entrusted with “the 
development and promotion of a national policy for scientific research and scientific 
education, the support of basic research in non-profit organisations, development of 
scientific talent in American youth by means of scholarships and fellowships, with the 
support of long range research on military matter by means of contract or 
otherwise.”16 
 
The debate in India was settled in favour of the Hill-Bhatnagar model. A Department 
of Planning and Development was created (August 1944) and the Council for 
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was brought under its control.17 On the 
recommendations from Hill and from a further appointed Industrial Research 
																																																																																																																																																														
City: Bangalore Press, 1934); -Nation Building: A Five Year Plan for the Provinces (Bangalore City: 
Bangalore Press, 1937); -Reconstruction in Post-war India: A Plan of Development all Round 
(Bombay, 1944). His appreciation for ultra-nationalist reconstruction was not exceptional, many in 
India among the nationalist leadership held Japanese, Italian and German governments of the inter-war 
period in favourable view. 
15 Meghnad Saha, “Experience as a Member of the Indian Scientific Mission – 1946,” in Santimay 
Chatterjee, ed. Collected Works of Meghnad Saha IV (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1993). 
16 Meghnad Saha, “Department of Scientific Research,” in Science and Culture 14 (1948, 1993), 155. 
See also Editorial, Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research VI, no. 12 (December 1947), 1. 
17 A Scientific Consultative Committee was also established (December 1944) to advise the 
Department and the government on matters of science policy. See, Editorial, “A Central Organisation 
for Scientific Research” in Journal of Scientific and Industrial Research, III 9 (March 1945), pp. 382-
83. 
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Planning Committee, a national laboratory system was created under the CSIR.18 
While the CSIR laboratories continued to expand, the Department wound up in a 
short span of two years: “Somehow, the department was under the idea that its 
function was not confined to only planning but extended also to include the execution 
of those plans (development). It was this idea which brought the department into 
direct conflict with other departments of the Government of India as each of them felt 
that their sphere of activity were to be very much curtained and they were going to be 
bossed by a Superintendent.”19 There appears to have been no clear deliberation or 
agreement on what planning was about: was it to provide strategic direction or was it 
about planning specific projects? A scientific and industrial research system 
integrated into centralised planning for development of the new country, it appeared, 
was not going to work. Another attempt at the renewal of this idea would not be taken 
up for another two and a half decades. 
 
In the meanwhile, the institutional and research infrastructure for science and 
engineering education as well as research grew exponentially in India after 
independence. Under the Nehru regime, the CSIR grew into a national laboratory 
system with Bhatnagar at the helm for the first ten years. The number of laboratories 
grew from four to sixteen.20 The government employed a “large majority” of 
scientists and engineers in the country.21 By the mid-1960s, the CSIR was under the 
Ministry of Education.22  In keeping with the logic of centralisation, other 
departments governing science and engineering also emerged. A Department of 
Atomic Energy (DAE) was set up on 3 August 1954 under the direct charge of the 
Prime Minister through a Presidential Order. The physicist Homi Jehangir Bhabha 
was appointed Secretary of the DAE.23 
 
Only a year later, two international meetings showcased the relationship between 
China and India: Atoms for Peace at Geneva and the first meeting of the Non Aligned 
Movement in Bandung. In February 1955, the Soviet Union had accepted an Indian 
foreign policy of non-alignment; Indian foreign policy was supportive of Communist 
China; and the Bandung Conference was planned for later that year. Jawaharlal Nehru 
																																																								
18 Four laboratories were recommended: National Physical Laboratory, National Chemical Laboratory, 
National Metallurgical Laboratory, and the Central Glass and Ceramic Institute. In addition, a National 
Trust for Patents and a Bureau of Standards and Specifications were also established. 
19 “National Research Council,” editorial, Science and Culture, 13, 1947, p.123. 
20 M S Thacker took over following Bhatnagar’s death in 1956; he left for the Planning Commission in 
1962 and was in turn was succeeded by Hussain Zaheer.  This close nexus with the Planning 
Commission would continue until the mid-1970s. 
21 Baldev Raj Nayar, India's Quest for Technological Independence: Volume I: Policy Foundation and 
Policy Change. New Delhi: Lancers, 1983; pp. 439. 
22 It was not always the case that the CSIR fell under the Ministry of Education. Its location moved 
thus: under the Department of Scientific Research that was established in 1948; in 1951, this became 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research; in 1957 the ministry was merged to form a 
Ministry of Education and Scientific Research – which, within a year led to a Ministry of Scientific 
Research and Cultural Affairs (1958). In five years this too was merged into the Ministry of Education 
with a further dissolution of the Department of Scientific Research. This was the state of affairs in 
1970. 
23 As Chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission of India (AECI), and Secretary, (DAE), Bhabha 
was responsible for the following institutions: the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, the Rare 
Minerals Survey Unit, the Indian Rare Earths Limited and finally, for reactors built and purchased by 
the AECI. See Anderson (2010) Chapters 11 and 14; and Phalkey (2013), Chapter 5. 
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and Homi Bhabha came to be seen as the politically acceptable face of Asia.24 The 
Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was important to them both but this was short-
lived. Following the announcement of the Bandung conference,  
 
“India’s Jawaharlal Nehru was the busiest man in London last 
week. Britain’s Anthony Eden wooed him, Burmese and 
Indonesian envoys sought him out. Communist China’s chief 
representative conferred with him twice. So did U. S. 
Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich, who got the full treatment on 
the “Asian” view of Formosa, featuring Red China’s 
indisputable right to Formosa and the U.S.’s “interference” in 
Asia’s affairs […] By default all hopes centred on Jawaharlal 
Nehru. The question was whether his intervention would do 
more harm than good. He was insisting that Red China’s 
ultimate right to Formosa must be recognised first […]”25 
 
The PRC was provided its first international forum and the first endorsement of its 
legitimate statehood in Indonesia, at the Bandung Conference in April-May 1955. The 
Atoms for Peace Conference took place in Geneva three months later. Homi Bhabha 
was invited to preside over the meeting. His choice as president of the meeting could 
also be seen as a reflection of taking Nehru’s India seriously. Bhabha’s presidential 
address to the Conference“ contained two unexpected statements that caused surprise. 
One concerned nuclear fusion. In the other, Bhabha regretted the exclusion of 
Communist China on Nehru’s behalf; “It is a matter of regret,” he said, “that there are 
several areas of the world which are not directly represented at this Conference”. 26 
 
The ties between the two countries were, however, not those of strong allies. There 
was an uneven exchange of ideas and personnel with inbuilt sense of competition and, 
therefore, a considered lack of trust.27 The physicist-statistician Prasanta Chandra 
Mahalanobis was one of the main architects of India’s Second Five Year Plan; he and 
his colleagues became aware of a Chinese science and technology plan  - to which we 
will return later. Only two years after Geneva and Bandung, Mahalanobis asked to see 
the science and technology plan on a visit to China in 1957. The Chinese held that 
statistical data and the plan, apart from its most general announcement, were secret. 
He was denied access. 28 
 
In the same year that the Chinese science and technology plan went online, an 
Industrial Policy Resolution (April 1956) was launched in India. The Industrial Policy 
Resolution (IPR) was aligned closely to the Directive Principles of State Policy – a 
section of the Indian Constitution that articulates the moral duties of the Indian state 
towards its citizens: “The State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by 
securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social 																																																								
24 On 8 February 1955, Foreign Minister Molotov of the USSR accepted Nehru's (and Zhou Enlai's) 
Panch Sheel – the five principles of non-alignment to be followed in Indian foreign policy. See 
Benjamin Zachariah, (2005), 214-252, at 216. 
25 “The Man Between,” Time Magazine (February 14, 1955). 
26 For an analysis of Bhabha’s speech, see Abraham (1998), 98-106. 
27 See Arunabh Ghosh “Accepting Difference, Seeking Common Ground: Sino-Indian Statistical 
Exchanges 1951-1959,” in this volume. 
28 Arunabh Ghosh, Making it Count: Statistics and State-Society Relations in the Early People's 
Republic of China, 1949-1959, PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2014, pp. 314. 
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economic and political, shall inform, all the institutions of national life.”29 Planning 
was being pursued in India with great enthusiasm following the establishment of the 
Planning Commission of India (1951). Industrialisation and agriculture took priority 
in turns, and science and engineering were integral to the plan. The IPR was drawn up 
in consultation with the Planning Commission; and brought together the moral 
obligations of the Indian state with the ideological commitments articulated in the 
first decade of independence: 
 
“…. These basic principles were given a more precise 
direction when Parliament accepted in December 1954 the 
socialistic pattern of society as the objective of social and 
economic policy…. In order to realise this objective, it is 
essential to accelerate the rate of economic growth and to 
speed up industrialisation and, in particular, to develop heavy 
industries and machine making industries, to expand the 
public sector, and to build up a large and growing cooperative 
sector….  Accordingly, the State will progressively assume a 
predominant and direct responsibility for setting up new 
industrial undertakings…. ”30 
 
Two years later, a Science Policy Resolution (SPR) was approved by parliament 
(March 1958). Scholars have claimed that Homi Bhabha wrote the document and 
persuaded Nehru that he consider adopting it.31 The SPR was first discussed by the 
Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet (SACC) and among its members was 
Mahalanobis – who was aware of the Chinese plan.32 However, it is difficult to say if 
this was even marginally triggered by the launch of the Chinese plan. The resolution 
was a brief document and not a substantial plan that resonated ideas already expressed 
in the IPR: “…the wealth and prosperity of a nation depended on the effective 
utilisation of its human and material resources through industrialisation.”33 This 
effective utilisation called for education in science, training in technical skills and 
“Science and technology can make up for the deficiencies in raw materials by 
providing substitutes, or, indeed, by providing skills which can be exported in return 
for raw materials.”34 
 
While the IPR was expected to help launch a robust industrial public sector, the SPR 
could shape education and teaching in science and engineering. As a result, political 
leadership and SACC called for the First Conference of Scientists to address the 																																																								
29 Industrial Policy Resolution, 30 April 1956 accessed at http://eaindustry.nic.in/handbk/chap001.pdf 
in March 2016. 
30 Industrial Policy Resolution 30 April 1956, accessed at http://eaindustry.nic.in/handbk/chap001.pdf 
(March 2016) 
31 Robert S. Anderson (2010), pp. 254-57. 
32 The other members of this newly constituted committee were the physicist K S Krishnan, Director 
National Physical Laboratory; the electrical engineer M S Thacker who succeeded Bhatnagar as 
Director of the CSIR; the physicist Daulat Singh Kothari who chaired the Defence Research and 
Development Organisation; B P Pal of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research; the physician C G 
Pandit of the Indian Council for Medical Research. 
33 “Science Policy Resolution” accessed at 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130116025514/http://dst.gov.in/stsysindia/spr1958.htm in February 
2016. 
34 Science Policy Resolution. Ibid. 
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growing gap between state-funded scientific research in the national laboratories and 
the universities. The conference, Robert S Anderson argues, was to build a 
constituency for the resolution’s implementation – and, crucially, to discuss the 
objectives of the resolution also with cabinet ministers.35 The most challenging of 
goals was to create a pool of trained scientists, engineers and technicians and to create 
jobs they could keep. Improved salaries and new textbooks were among the 
recommendations of the conference. While some expressed concern over the missing 
mention of “technology” with the resolutions goals rather specifically focused on 
science, the conference informed the establishment of regional engineering colleges 
and polytechnics alongside the rather well funded Indian institutes of technology. A 
comparable crop of institutions dedicated to science education was not to be seen until 
well into the twenty first century. 
 
As the decade grew to a close, the Chinese had begun distancing themselves from the 
Soviet Union. India’s engagement with the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was 
growing.36 The Indian relationship to China, though, took a nosedive as they went to 
war over territory in the Himalayas (1962). Nehru was not prepared for this attack 
although his surprise was not convincing to his colleagues or to scholars today.37 The 
physicist S Bhagavantam, science advisor to the Defence Research and Development 
Organisation (est. 1948) was worried that “defence is mentioned only once in the 
Science Policy Resolution … and such an imbalance should be corrected. We cannot 
separate scientific output into water-tight compartments, separating defence 
laboratories from universities and civilian laboratories.”38 Within two years, the 
Chinese had conducted their nuclear tests (1964). Exactly ten years after John 
Desmond Bernal concluded that the Chinese were ahead of the Indians, Patrick 
Maynard Stuart Blackett, science and defence advisor to Jawaharlal Nehru, informed 
Hussain Zaheer, director of CSIR, that the Chinese were far advanced in electronics.39 
Zaheer agreed with Blackett. However, the problem lay not in the underdevelopment 
of the electronics laboratories: “The bigger issue at stake was not simply electronic 
instruments for researchers or electronic engineering for military systems, or even 
consumer electronics; the bigger issue was the supply and delivery of electricity 
itself.”40 
 																																																								
35 Robert S. Anderson (2010), pp. 256. 
36 The Indian delegation was invited to visit the Soviet Union at the Atoms for Peace meeting in 
Geneva. Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in February 1960, and were given a tour of the Tata 
Institute of Fundamental Research. Bhabha led an Indian delegation to the Soviet Union in the summer 
of 1960. In February 1961, Bhabha announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to build a reactor for 
India. In a public statement, Bhabha mentioned inspections required by the IAEA for reactors coming 
in from the USA as an “ infringement upon Indian sovereignty”. The Soviet Union was not a member 
of the IAEA and “hailed the opposition of India and other non-aligned Afro-Asian nations to IAEA 
controls over their nuclear development programs.” An Indo-Soviet agreement was signed on October 
7, 1961. The Hindu February 3, 1961 and The Statesman, October 7, 1961. Quoted in Arthur Stein, 
India and the Soviet Union: The Nehru Era (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 180-182. 
37 Srinath Raghavan, “The fifty year crisis: India and China since 1962” in “India 2012” Seminar 641, 
(January 2013). http://www.india-seminar.com/2013/641/641_srinath_raghavan.htm 
38 Quoted in Robert S. Anderson (2010), pp. 265. 
39 Robert S. Anderson, “Patrick Blackett in India: Military consultant and scientific intervenor”, 1947-
72, Part II” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London 53, no. 3 (1999b): 345-359; and “Patrick 
Blackett in India: Military consultant and scientific intervenor, 1947-72, Part I” Notes and Records of 
the Royal Society of London 53, no. 3, (1999a): 253-273. 
40 Robert S. Anderson (2010), pp. 273. 
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At the same time as scientists were struggling to isolate bottlenecks and problems of 
development, these events opened the question of nuclear capability to public debate 
for the first time in India. The following circumstances were important to the terms of 
the debate: Nehru died the same year as the Chinese nuclear tests. Only a year later, 
India and Pakistan went to war (1965). The key scientist administrator of matters 
nuclear in India, Homi Bhabha, died in the year Indira Gandhi assumed political 
leadership of the country (1966). India, at the launch of Indira’s regime, faced a near 
complete change of guard. Her thinking on science policy was inextricable from the 
debate on the place and purpose of science and engineering in India following the two 
wars and the Chinese nuclear tests.41 If defence and economic growth were a priority, 
the infrastructure for their delivery was fundamental. Her broader vision, however, 
remained entwined and substantially engaged with that of her father as articulated in 
the Science Policy Resolution. Her government questioned the uneven and lagging 
implementation of the SPR: that discussion would eventually lead to the one and only 
science and technology plan of India. 
 
A Science and Technology Plan for India 
Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India in 1966. After nearly two decades 
of her father’s regime (with a two year interlude), it was under her regime, that the 
first science and technology plan of India was designed. Many who Jawaharlal Nehru 
worked with, scientists as well as bureaucrats, were no more. The CSIR held 
oversight on the allocation of funding for scientific and industrial research through a 
national laboratory system reporting directly to the prime minister. Scientific and 
industrial research was completely decoupled from planning by the early 1950s 
leaving no direct mechanism for oversight, dialogue, or advice between these two sets 
of institutions, if that were ever thought desirable. This was further consolidated with 
the establishment of a separate department of atomic energy reporting, again, directly 
to the prime minister. There was little or no coordination between these institutions.42 
Moreover, they were all removed from university-based research and advanced 
education. A range of new institutions of “national importance,” including the five 
Indian institutes of technology, emerged at this time. However, within the emerging 
science and technology establishment, the link between research and teaching appears 
to have been broken irreversibly even if not without regret.43 
 
Indira Gandhi inherited, the political scientist R Natarajan argues, a collection of state 
funded laboratories and research institutions that were not linked into industry – 
public or private; industry, both public and private, heavily depended on imported 
technology; there were no administrative mechanisms to cost-balance or judge the 
appropriateness of imported technology; and finally, as we saw above, insufficient 
numbers of engineers and technicians who were able adapt new technologies or 
generate new ones at home. And this only as far as engineering and technology are 																																																								
41 Srinath Raghavan, “Indira Gandhi: India and the World in Transition” in Ramachandra Guha Ed. 
Makers of Modern Asia (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 215-243. 
42 For a comprehensive view on science policy and science institutions see, Balwant Bhaneja, Science 
and Government, The Nehru Era: Accountability of Science Policy in India (New Delhi: National 
Publishing House, 1992); and Ward Morehouse, Sarkar and Vigyan: Problems and Prospects of 
Government and Science in India (unpublished manuscript, 1967). 
43 Dhruv Raina and Ashok Jain, “Big Science and the University in India” in John Krige and 
Dominique Pestre, eds., Science in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1997), 859-878; Homi J Bhabha,. “Science and the Problems Of Development” Science 51, No. 3710 
(1966): 541-548. 
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concerned – not science. Gandhi addressed what her regime saw as problems by 
creating new institutions for research and science administration with scientists and 
engineers in decision making positions through expansion of funding for research 
including reallocation in some cases; oversight on import of technology and 
encouragement of R&D in the private sector; and finally, the formulation of an 
explicit technology policy to align economic production with research and 
development.44 It is in this context that we could understand the science and 
technology plan launched in August 1973. 
 
The long-1970s in India witnessed two interlinked crises: a crisis of domestic politics 
and a global crisis of development. At home, a severe drought in 1966 saw significant 
reallocation of research budgets to the Indian Council for Agricultural Research 
(ICAR). This marked the beginning of the state-led efforts towards the Green 
Revolution: “Recent events have compelled us to explore the fullest possibilities of 
technological reliance,” said Gandhi.45 “It is now our endeavour to rationalize the 
structure of Indian science and to relate it more closely with the process of planning 
and development…. Growth cannot be sustained on borrowed or even adapted 
technology. True self-reliance can come only as we develop the ability to solve our 
technological problems.”46 Technological self-reliance was evoked in the Congress 
Party Manifesto (1967) and they took it one step further when the party approved a 
“Resolution on Science and Technology” (1969) calling for one per cent of the Gross 
National Product (GNP) to be dedicated to research and development. The resolution 
also suggested making R&D budgets mandatory for the public and private sectors, 
alongside an increase the number of scientists and engineers in decision-making 
positions. Most significantly, the Congress party resolution called for the 
establishment of a Ministry of Science and Technology.47 
 
Indira Gandhi and the Congress were reasserting their faith in technology to solve 
India’s pressing problems in a language of Cold War geopolitics: technical assistance 
was available from both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the United 
Nations. At this moment, the student movement worldwide raised morally charged 
questions about the legitimacy of political conduct, progress, and warfare in and 
around 1968. A strong student movement in India also began to question the 
government’s commitment to ideas of development, progress and modernisation as 
they had failed to deliver on their liberating potential through access to education and 
employment.48 General discontent combined with a crisis of leadership even within 																																																								
44 R Natarajan, “Science, Technology and Mrs Gandhi” Journal of Asian and African Studies 22 (1987) 
3-4, pp. 98-115, on 99-100. Natarajan finds that the Indian science and technology plan compares 
globally only to the design reform campaign by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (1964). See also Mahesh Rangarajan, “Striving for a balance: Nature, power, science and India's 
Indira Gandhi” in Conservation and Society, vol. 7 (4) 2009; pp. 299-312. 
45 Indira Gandhi, Selected Speeches of Indira Gandhi: January 1966-August 1969, New Delhi: 
Publications Division, 1971; pp.5. 
46 Indira Gandhi Abhinandan Samiti, The Spirit of India-I Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1975; pp. 
205-6. 
47 R Chandidas, et. al., India Votes, New York: Humanities Press, 1968; pp. 7. Incidentally, the United 
States advised Taiwan, around the same time, to invest one per-cent of the GDP for research and 
development. 
48 Nagindas Sanghavi et.al, “From Navnirman to the anti-Mandal riots: the political trajectory of 
Gujarat (1974–1985)” in South Asian History and Culture vol. 1, no. 4, (2010), pp. 480-493; Pravin N. 
Sheth, Nav Nirman and Political Change in India: From Gujarat 1974 to New Delhi 1977. Bombay: 
Vora, 1977; David Hardiman, “Tribute to Kanu Bhavsar - Activist, Researcher, Therapist” in 
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the Indian National Congress led to the first split in the party (1969). The war that 
created Bangladesh (1971) and the subsequent meltdown of relations with the United 
States only strengthened Gandhi’s election slogan: Garibi Hatao (Hindi, Eradicate 
Poverty) – the campaign emphatically pressed for self-reliance, an idea to which we 
shall return later. At the moment, we will continue to explore the making of the 
science and technology plan as a response to political and institutional crisis: Worried 
about the fragmenting nature of state power amidst growing political unrest, Indira 
Gandhi and her regime took to restructuring and centralising in order to bring the 
diverse agents responsible for a policy area, science and technology included, to 
speak to a united and systematic agenda. 
 
Government policy on science and technology were also questioned. The majority of 
India’s scientists and engineers were employed by the state and there was internal 
discontent: Yelavarthy Nayudamma, then Director of the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research (1971-77) described: “…the scientific scene presented an arena of 
intense controversy, appointment of committees over committees, questioning 
introspection, discussions, sometimes acrimonious, in and outside the press and 
Parliament and in scientific forums on the strategy, organisation and planning of 
scientific and industrial R&D.”49 Growth of science in India, Aqueil Ahmad of the 
Administrative Staff College of India argued, was essentially a “management 
problem”.50 “The initial mistake after Independence was organisational. We started 
adding large, complex organisations to the existing bureaucratic structure, thus 
making it even more centralised and complex instead of creating small, homogenous, 
autonomous, goal oriented research departments or laboratories where management 
would have been simpler and the objectives easily identified and readily 
achievable.”51 
 
In this climate of self diagnosed malaise, the existing Scientific Advisory Committee 
to the Cabinet (SACC) with advisory oversight but no powers or machinery to address 
the discontent, or more immediately, judge the appropriateness of imported 
technology appeared inadequate.52 In line with the new government’s mood to 
restructure, SACC was dissolved to establish a new Committee on Science and 
Technology (COST). The new committee had an advisory function, but was also 
charged with drawing up R&D priorities in consultation with various ministries of the 
government. In this capacity, COST called for a Round Table of scientists and 
technologists (1970); they were far from satisfied with the implementation of the 
Science Policy Resolution. As a way of addressing that problem, they called for a 																																																																																																																																																														
Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 50, Issue No. 8, 21 Feb, 2015 accessed at 
http://www.epw.in/journal/2015/8/web-exclusives/tribute-kanu-bhavsar-activist-researcher-
therapist.html 
49 Yelavarthy Nayudamma, “Developing Patters of Industrial R&D Culture” Journal of Scientific and 
Industrial Research, vol. 32, no. 6, June 1973; pp. 271. 
50 Aqueil Ahmad, “Science as a Management Problem” in Economic and Political Weekly August 3, 
1968, pp. 1214-17.  
51 Ahmad (1968), p. 1214. 
52 The inadequacy was highlighted in the third Science Round Table (1970) when Gandhi met with 
leading scientists and engineers (the previous meetings was held in 1958 and 1963). The Round Table 
recommended the creation of an additional National Council for Scientific Research as well as the 
establishment of a dedicated Ministry of Science and Technology. The Administrative Reforms 
Committee, in the very same year, made equally pointed and controversial suggestions for the 
reorganisation of science administration. 
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comprehensive science and technology plan.53 A new Department of Science and 
Technology was created under which COST was dissolved to make way for a new 
National Committee on Science and Technology (NCST) of fifteen members and a 
chairperson who would also function as the science advisor to the Prime Minister. 
The NCST’s explicit mandate was to re-couple science and industrial research with 
economic development in creating direct links with the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974-
79). Around the same time, at the dedication of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station, 
Gandhi warned: “We feel that a country as large as ours, with its rich and variegated 
technical talent should work progressively towards self-reliance. Our past experience 
has been that aid can be stopped at crucial moments.”54 
 
What was the science and technology plan of 1974-79? The National Committee on 
Science and Technology (NCST) was mandated to direct technological change and to 
ensure that the priorities of development, resource allocation, and research priorities 
were aligned with each other. In order to accomplish this, they were to build strong 
links to the Planning Commission and the Fifth Five Year Plan on the one hand, and 
various ministerial departments, or user ministries as they were called, on the other. 
This included the newly created departments science and technology, of space, and 
electronics. Science and Technology, in the spirit of the emerging managerialism at 
the time, was also a “management problem”. 
 
Already at inception, there were differences on the purpose of the science and 
technology plan. Parmeshwar Narayan Haksar, principal secretary to the Prime 
Minister (and later deputy chairperson, Planning Commission) was the voice of those 
who thought that the government should focus its efforts on key sectors, which should 
eventually lead to over all improvement (and economic growth). On the other hand, 
Ashok Parthasarathi, special assistant for science in the Prime Ministers secretariat, 
voiced those who argued that science and technology had to be strengthened 
comprehensively and not selectively. What was clear to both camps was the 
following: that in the two decades after independence, a significant expansion of 
science and technology institutions under various ministries and departments had not 
led to a system at the national level. By the early 1970s, this came to be seen as a 
problem articulated through various claims: that the lack of systematic investment had 
led to uneven returns; the lack of system made it difficult to establish funding 																																																								
53 Natarajan (1987), pp. 239. COST proceedings were not without controversy. Two notes of dissent on 
COST assessment of where R&D in India fell short of implementing goals stated in the Science Policy 
Resolution were submitted by Homi Sethna of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and Kakkadan 
Nandanath Raj of the Economic Weekly; and another by Vikram Sarabhai, Chairman Atomic Energy 
Commission. Sethna and Raj recalled that “An earlier draft of the Report had referred to feudalism in 
this sphere: this to our mind, is the correct description of the values and methods of decision making in 
evidence in most of these institutions... We believe that unless this issue is directly faced and resolved, 
much progress cannot be made in the near future.” Sarabhai was brutal: Behaviourly (sic) our 
performance clearly indicates that the policy makers at the top, responsible for organisation and 
commitment of resources for development do not have an appropriate understanding of the purpose and 
content of the Science Policy Resolution (1958) and the investments that are required in order to derive 
returns from the effort…. (t)he failure of the Planning Commission in not recognising the meaningful 
applications of science and technology as investments for national development and for not according 
appropriate priority for undertaking these tasks.” See Proceedings of the Third National Conference of 
Scientists, Technologists and Educationists New Delhi, 1971; pp. 261-79. 
54 This was also the time when there was tremendous pressure from the United States for the Indians to 
sign the Non Proliferation Treaty; Indira Gandhi, The Years of Endeavour: Selected Speeches of Indira 
Gandhi New Delhi: Publications Division, 1975, pp. 422. 
	 14	
priorities, but more so, the lack of system made these institutions difficult to govern 
which was untenable in a climate where state power was fragmenting, political 
leadership faced a crisis of legitimacy, ideas of progress as well as the ability of the 
state to deliver was in question, and in addition, the science establishment was itself 
in turmoil. 
 
The NCST pulled together a range of institutions and individuals; and with more than 
eighteen hundred participating scientists and engineers formulated the plan in less 
than two years.55 A draft was opened to public discussion in January 1973 with the 
publication of the “Approach to the Science and Technology Plan.” The final plan 
was released a year later.56 Twenty-four sectors in science and technology were 
targeted for their ability to address the “total overview of the nation’s scientific and 
technological needs”.57 Each sector had a dedicated panel assisted by several working 
groups; the working groups were primarily responsible for drawing up the specific 
research and development projects in consultation with user ministries. All effort was 
directed at synchronising with the two main stated goals of the Fifth Five Year Plan: 
to meet the basic needs of the population, and self-reliance. The Approach document 
outlined a third: of rationalising policies towards the import of technology. 58 
 
The NCST sought detailed research proposals from national laboratories and other 
state-funded research institutions. The projects were to be justified for “socio-
economic impact”, “status of the technology (to be developed or used)”, “requirement 
for scientific personnel”, “(end) users of technology” and, finally, “importance of the 
project”. The working groups, with representative members from the ministries, 
assessed these projects and the panel eventually decided on projects to be 
recommended for inclusion in the plan and, therefore, funding by the Planning 
Commission. The process, it turns out, was not easy: the Planning Commission, at 
least according to one contemporary observer, was difficult to please. Apart from 
suggesting that the NCST plagiarised the Commission’s own approach paper to the 
Fifth Five Year Plan, they also suggested that the science and technology plan itself 
was a “large scale reproduction of another science plan document conceived 
abroad”.59 The accusation of plagiarism is not sustained but it is hardly surprising that 																																																								
55 See: Balwant Bhaneja, “India’s Science and Technology Plan, 1974-79” in Social Studies of Science, 
6 (1976): 99-104. 
56  The budget for research and development over five years was estimated at Rupees 1725.61 crore 
and the plan was expected to generate employment for 120,000 scientists and technologists. A crore is 
a unit in the Indian numbering system where one crore is equal to ten million. 
57 Twenty seven dedicated panels with two hundred and thirty three working groups were assigned to 
each of the twenty-four sectors which included: agriculture, heavy engineering, natural resources, 
marine resources, chemical industries, consumer industries, village and Khadi industries, housing, 
health, transport, fuel and power etc. The number of working groups varied: heavy engineering had 
fourteen working groups and village and Khadi industries had only two. 
58 In the period leading up to the science and technology plan foreign exchange was scarce. Three 
committees reviewed the import of technology between 1966-1971, and as a result a Foreign 
Investment Board was set up (1973) to evaluate the appropriateness of foreign collaborations and 
imports. See Ghayur Alam, “India’s Technology Policy and its Influence on Technology Imports and 
Technology Development,” in Economic and Political Weekly vol. 20, nos. 45-47, (1985), pp. 2073-80. 
59 For an overview see: Science in Underdeveloped Countries: World Plan of Action for the 
Application of Science and Technology to Development, Report of the Advisory Committee on the 
Application of Science and Technology to Development (24 November-5 December 1969). The 
advisory committee were consultants to the UN and otherwise located at the Institute for Development 
Studies and Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex (a topic well deserving of its own history). The 
regional plans set goals for the following development sectors: science policy and planning (creation 
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inter-departmental rivalry and competition for turf between various institutions is 
exacerbated in the context of systematisation, centralisation and management from 
above. 
 
The “plan conceived abroad” was the “World Plan of Action for the Application of 
Science and Technology to Development” released by the United Nations Advisory 
Committee on Science and Technology in Addis Ababa (3-14 February 1969).60 This 
plan began with the Economic and Social Council organised first United Nations 
Conference on Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less-Developed Areas in 
Geneva from (1963). An Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and 
Technology for Development (ACAST) continued the work and released, in 1971, the 
“World Plan of Action....” Of the two parts of the plan, the first dealt with areas in 
which member states felt science and technology could make a resounding impact. 
The second was dedicated to science policy, institutional and educational matters, 
with greater stress on effective science policy. ACAST being an advisory body only, 
was dissolved to make way for a Committee on Science and Technology for 
Development (CSTD) as a forum to discuss science policy. A further Office of 
Science and Technology was created within the UN system to plan for the 
implementation of CSTD recommendations. Three regional plans for Africa, Asia and 
Latin America set the targets and a number of programmes specifically for each 
region. 
 
The Indian science and technology plan was thus a product also of an emerging global 
consensus on the purposeful harnessing of science and technology for development. If 
the discussions of the 1940s, which included Bernal who spoke to both the Chinese 
and the Indian condition, were focused on science and society, on social 
responsibilities of the scientist, then the discussions of the 1970s had taken on board 
the post-war language of modernisation and development and the responsibilities of 
the state. And this language was specific: the world had not yet congealed into three 
tiers in the late 1940s; it was resolutely the case by the 1970s. If the Indian science 
and technology plan was a response to interlinked domestic and global crises, those 
crises were produced by the projects and expectations of development promoted and 
pursued through Cold War geopolitics. The science and technology plan was both a 
result of and a response to the very same processes and anxieties. 
 
The anxieties sometimes played out as turf wars and at other times simply made 
apparent that the mechanisms of coordination were missing for what were assumed to 
be institutions bound to each other through goals and purposes: the dialogue between 
temporary planning units set up in ministries proved difficult as the status of these 
units in relation to the NCST was not clear. Were they partners, service units, 
subordinate or autonomous (in relation to the NCST) in order to establish research 
and development priorities for their respective ministries? 61 At the end of the two-																																																																																																																																																														
and expansion of infrastructure for research and development); natural resources; food and agriculture; 
industry, transport and telecommunications; housing and urban planning; health; education and 
population. There appears to be no significant resemblance between the two documents – the Indian 
document carries detailed project plans drawn up by various national laboratories. 
60 Vladislav P. Kotchetkov, “Science and Technology Policy in The United Nations System: A 
Historical Overview,” in P Lorenzano, H. J Rheinberger, E Ortiz, and C. Galles (eds.), History and 
Philosophy of Science and Technology, Vol. 4, Oxford: EOLSS Publishers Co. Ltd., 2010; pp. 208-
232. 
61 Bhaneja (1976), p.101. 
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year process of drawing up the plan, the Planning Commission still held the authority 
to allocate resources. It is no wonder that writing the plan was contentious as this was 
about securing resources and not only about establishing research priorities. 
 
The autonomy given the science and engineering community to determine research 
priorities was appreciated.62 However, as Balwant Bhaneja, a political scientist 
writing at the time noted, the plan assumed a “total science and technology system… 
(with) resources for investment, technology, and managerial efficiency. In a 
developing country all of these three are either scarce or underutilized.” In 
“channelling standardized information into a central body like the NCST, (the plan) 
has tended to reduce the number of implicit assumptions on which many of the 
institutions earlier functioned…. And provided a lead by introducing a more explicit 
method of preparation of departmental estimates.”63 In sum, the political scientist 
Baldev Raj Nayar argued: the plan was an aggregate of projects “rather than a product 
of rigorous and integrated planning.”64 It was also a partial plan in that the bulk of the 
focus was on the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; the Indian Council 
for Medical Research; and public sector industrial units. No detailed consideration 
was given to agriculture, atomic energy (half a page), defence, electronics, and space. 
Many of these fiercely guarded their autonomy from the planning exercise.65 
 
As a result of the planning process, if not the plan itself, there was a significant 
increase in the bureaucracy for science and technology administration and a 
formalisation of decision-making on research and development. Moreover, the 
exercise was also not about the future in a direct way: it was about taking stock of 
existing infrastructure to reorganise and reorient rather than to plan for what might 
else be required in the future. The Planning Commission significantly reduced the 
allocations requested but nonetheless, the mechanisms for the pursuit of purposeful 
engagement between various state institutions were now in place: “the paradigm was 
neo-Keynesian, the theme was self reliance, the solutions proposed were 
managerial.”66 
 
At the same time, the budget allocation by the NCST appeared to be quite similar to 
pre-plan allocation: the only difference being that all programmes now had a high 
applied component.67 To some, this would appear a success of the plan’s 
conceptualisation. A critique of the plan that remained unaddressed was the inability 
of its leaders to conceptualise how the basic needs of the population were to be met 
by import substitution and development of technologies in the country, apart from 
implying that planning could create jobs and save foreign exchange. Could R&D 
create state capacity to eventually meet the basic requirements of its citizens? 
 																																																								
62 Bhaneja (1976), p.100. 
63 Bhaneja (1976), p.103. 
64 Nayar (1983), p. 463. 
65 Ashok Parthasarathi suggests that the NCST did manage to rein in the Department of Atomic Energy 
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The citizens had in the meanwhile run out of patience. Protests against rising prices, 
unemployment, corruption, and inflation had citizens marching all over the country. 
Students took to the helm alongside trade unions and political opposition leading to 
clashes with the police. In the middle of a twenty-day countrywide strike (8-27 May 
1974) drawing in over one hundred and seventy thousand railway workers asking for 
fair wages, Indira Gandhi and her government allowed the country’s first peaceful 
nuclear experiments, as they were called, to proceed on 18 May 1974. The strike was 
brutally supressed by all accounts,68 but that was not the end. On 5 June 1974, the 
socialist leader Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-1979) called for a Total Revolution 
because: “Educational institutions are corrupt. Thousands of youth face a bleak future. 
Unemployment goes on increasing. The poor get less and less work. Land ceiling 
laws are passed but the number of landless people is increasing. Small farmers have 
lost their lands.”69 It was the return of a radical Gandhian critique energised by 
student politics.70 In a years time – and in a year into the implementation of science 
and technology plan - citing internal and external threats to national security after 
another war with Pakistan (that led to the creation of Bangladesh, 1971), the oil crisis, 
and internal student and trade union agitations, India Gandhi, in agreement with the 
President of India, Fakhruddin Ahmed declared an Emergency (25 June 1975 – 21 
March 1977).71 Just two months prior to this announcement, the first Indian satellite, 
Aryabhatta, was launched into space from a Russian space station on 19 April 1975.72 
 
A controversial Constitution (Forty-second amendment) Act, 1976, was ratified 
during the Emergency. The amendment introduced wide-ranging changes to the 
Constitution of India. In the Preamble, India went from being called a “sovereign 
democratic republic” to a “sovereign, socialist secular democratic republic.” Most 
interesting to us the introduction of a new Part IV (a): “It shall be the duty of every 
citizen of India … to develop the scientific temper, humanism and the spirit of inquiry 																																																								
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and reform.”73 In the year that the science and technology plan began to take shape, 
Daniel Bell in his new publication The Post-Industrial Society argued that the society 
of the near future was one “organised around knowledge for the purpose of social 
control and the directing of innovation and change.”74 Indira’s government was 
determinedly pursuing both social control and directing technological change. 
 
The Fifth Five Year Plan as well as the Science and Technology Plan took off less 
than a year before the declaration of the Emergency. The short history of the plans 
realisation, however partial, should be explored. Given the near complete control over 
bureaucracy during the following twenty-one months, one might expect that both 
plans were executed with great vigour. The citizens appear not impressed by the 
nuclear tests or the launch of a satellite: Indira Gandhi lost elections following the 
withdrawal of the Emergency in 1977, and the incoming government did not see merit 
in continuing implementation of the science and technology plan. In that we are likely 
to find important stories on science and government in India; and more specifically, 
the plan’s links to at least three crises: the crisis of development, of institutions, and 
the crisis within the scientific establishment as they renegotiated their autonomy and 
purpose in a climate of unstable politics, fluctuating priorities, war, and resource 
scarcity. 
 
Planning for Science and Technology in Cold War China 
As in India, science and technology have played a key role in the modern history of 
China, but along a path and in a social and political context that presented interesting 
similarities and differences with that in its Asian neighbour and other countries. Some 
of the factors that drove the development of science and technology in modern India, 
such as national independence and developmental aspirations, were also, in various 
forms, present in modern China, but others, such as ideology and international 
geopolitics seemed to have exerted a stronger influence in China than in India or 
indeed elsewhere.   
 
Like Nehru, Chinese communist party-state leaders under Mao Zedong placed science 
and technology high in their rhetoric from the founding of the People’s Republic of 
China in 1949 but did little to foster their indigenous development until 1955-1956, 
when a combination of factors led to the making of a major, comprehensive long-term 
plan for science and technology.75 Initially, the party-state leaders felt that they could 
rely on Soviet technical assistance to wage the war in Korea and lay a foundation for 
industrialization, especially in the form of more than 150 major Soviet-aided projects.  
With some exceptions, politically they also distrusted western-trained Chinese 
scientists and engineers that they had inherited from the Nationalist government 
which they had just defeated and driven to Taiwan. The new government had 
established the Chinese Academy of Sciences in November 1949, only one month 
after the founding of the PRC and based mainly on institutes of the Nationalists’ 																																																								
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Making of the 1956 Twelve-Year Science and Technology Plan,” History and Technology, 
forthcoming in 2016. 
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Academia Sinica (whose headquarters and a few of its institutes left with the 
Nationalists for Taiwan). But the academy was given few mandates or resources 
during its early years, asked mainly to solve problems arising from production and to 
help with ideological “remoulding” of scientists.76 
 
Thus, when Mao made his historical visit to the Soviet Union in late 1949 and 
early 1950, he doggedly pursued a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union that 
would help him to meet two most urgent challenges: national security and economic 
development. The Sino-Soviet friendship treaty signed during his visit would, as he 
told a group of officials in northeast China on his way back to Beijing, not only help 
unify the Chinese people under the new government, deter western intervention with 
the promised Soviet nuclear umbrella, but also help establish “economic mutual-
assistance” between the two countries, referring implicitly to promised Soviet loans 
and technical assistance. Above all, Mao made a special point of his tours of Soviet 
factories. Their rapid growth showed Mao that “we can also start from small factories 
capable only of repairing automobiles and airplanes to big ones capable of making 
them.”77 
 
While most of the existing historical studies highlight the national security objective 
of Mao’s Soviet trip, it can be argued that development was not an insignificant part 
of Mao’s motivation in making the trip and even in formulating the famous “Leaning 
to One Side” policy of siding with the Soviet camp during this early stage of the Cold 
War. As Mao had already made clear in an article published in the People’s Daily on 
July 1, 1949, China had to lean to the Soviet side because the west, whose “rulers are 
still imperialists,” would never give assistance to this “people’s country” and “we 
belong to the Soviet-led anti-imperialist unified front and we can only seek truly 
friendly assistance from this side.”78 In February 1957, several years following his 
first Soviet trip, Mao once again lectured on the merits of leaning to and learning 
from the Soviet Union: 
 
 Let’s see who has helped us design and equip so many important factories? 
Did America do this for us? Did Great Britain do this for us? Neither did. 
Only the Soviet Union was willing to do so because it is a socialist country 
and because it is our ally.79 
 
So, at least initially, the availability of Soviet technical assistance seemed to have 
lessened the Chinese government’s perceived need for its own domestic scientific and 
technological resources. But the fortunes of Chinese scientists and the academy would 
improve, as did their counterparts under Stalin, when the Chinese party-state 
leadership moved gradually toward a nuclear decision in the mid-1950s, just as what 
had happened to Soviet scientists when Stalin decided to accelerate his nuclear 
program.80  																																																								
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There is evidence indicating that as early as spring 1952 Chinese leaders had begun to 
consider seriously the possibility of pursing nuclear weapons. On March 27, 1952, 
Premier Zhou Enlai sent two assistants to see Zhu Kezhen, meteorologist and vice 
president of the academy, to inquire about necessary conditions for the making of 
atomic bombs. Zhu listed three: concentration of specialists from a variety of 
disciplines, importation of cutting-edge information and instruments, and investment 
much more than that for conventional weapons. Zhu said that on the first condition, 
China had some specialists, such as the French-trained nuclear physicist Qian 
Sanqiang in the academy, but needed to recruit more, especially those currently 
studying or working abroad. On the second, he suggested that it would be best to try 
to get information and instruments directly from the Soviet Union in the form of 
technical assistance or otherwise obtained via discrete purchases from abroad. 
Apparently Zhou followed up by, among other measures, talking to the Soviets about 
nuclear assistance in mid-1952 when he led a delegation to Moscow to discuss 
Chinese economic planning. But the Soviets responded that China was far from being 
ready to launch a nuclear program and refused to provide nuclear information or 
specialists.81 
 
The next time Soviet nuclear assistance came up was during the visit by the Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev to Beijing, his first, in early October 1954 to celebrate the 
5th anniversary of the PRC. At a meeting Khrushchev asked Mao what requests he 
wanted to make, and was caught by surprise when Mao responded that “we are 
interested in atomic energy and nuclear weapons.” After a pause, Khrushchev told 
Mao, according to Mao’s translator, that nuclear weapons were too expensive, that the 
Soviet nuclear umbrella should be adequate to cover the whole socialist family, and 
that China should focus on economic development first. “If you want to make nuclear 
weapons at the present,” Khrushchev said, “it is hard to say whether all your 
electricity combined would be enough for this endeavour.” Nevertheless, as a 
concession, Khrushchev did agree to help China build a small nuclear reactor and 
train associated personnel.82  
 
Mao, of course, knew Khrushchev was right in questioning China’s industrial 
capabilities. A few days earlier he had admitted to the Indian politician Uma Nehru (a 
relative of Prime Minister Nehru also in Beijing for the festivities) that China lagged 
behind even India in industrialization “as a result of suppression of China by 
imperialists.” He mentioned, for example, that India’s total length of railroad tracks 
was longer than China, and the scale of its textile industry was twice that of China’s.83 
Two weeks later, Mao reiterated the same points to Prime Minister Nehru himself 
when the latter came to visit. With Nehru, Mao first elaborated on the two countries’ 
shared history of suffering at the hands of western imperialists: 
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 Even though we differ in ideology and social system, we have a major point of 
convergence, i.e. we both need to deal with imperialists. Prime Minister 
Nehru, you should not think that China is completely independent and free of 
problems. We still have one big problem: Taiwan is still in the hands of the 
United States and Jiang Jieshi. 
 
He then emphasized their mutual desire and need for industrialization: 
 
Our country is still not an industrial country, but an agricultural country. Our 
level of industrialization is lower even than India’s. We need to work hard for 
ten to twenty years in order to gain some achievements. Imperialists still look 
down on us now. Our two countries are in similar situations, as are all 
countries in the east.84  
 
Mao’s assessment was echoed by other Chinese leaders such as Premier Zhou Enlai 
who told a British delegation on October 21, 1954 that “we are making efforts toward 
progress in order to industrialize and lift our culture.”85 
 
In retrospect, the October 1954 meeting with Khrushchev must have alerted Mao, 
Zhou, and other Chinese leaders that China could not depend on Soviet assistance to 
build its atomic bombs and other hi-tech weaponry or modernization in general. 
Instead it would eventually need to rely on its own scientists and engineers for such 
endeavours while taking advantage as much and as long as possible of any Soviet 
assistance. Stung by the continued American threats to use nuclear weapons against 
China, including that during the Jinmen (Quemoy) incident in the Taiwan Strait in 
September 1954, and buoyed by the discovery of a uranium mine in Guangxi in 1954, 
Mao and other party-state leaders made the decision to launch China’s own nuclear 
weapons program at a high-level briefing by Qian and the geologist Li Siguang on 
January 15, 1955. Remembering Khrushchev’s earlier limited nuclear offer, Mao 
declared at the meeting that “now with the Soviet assistance, we should certainly 
make it work. Even if we have to do it on our own, we can also certainly get it to 
work.”86  
 
In conjunction with the nuclear decision, the party-state soon also undertook a number 
of measures in 1955-1956 to strengthen Chinese science and technology, especially 
by rehabilitating scientists and other intellectuals and by increasing investments. For 
example, the government approved the establishment, in mid-1955, of the prestigious 
academic divisions of the Chinese Academy of Sciences whose membership 
represented the highest scholarly honour in the country.87 Then, at the initiative of 																																																								
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Premier Zhou Enlai, who was more sympathetic to the scientists than Mao, the party 
held a major “Conference on the Issue of Intellectuals” in January 1956 to enhance 
and improve the political, professional, and material status of intellectuals in general 
and scientists in particular. It also launched a nation-wide “March on Science” 
movement.88   
 
For Chinese science policy, the single most important specific measure to emerge out 
of the conference on intellectuals was Zhou’s announcement of the making of a 
twelve-year (1956-1967) plan for science and technology. The original idea of a long-
term national science plan had come from V. A. Kovda, chief Soviet advisor at the 
academy, in January 1955, and it was soon embraced by the academy, the State 
Planning Commission, and, by the end of the year, influential members of the ruling 
Politburo, including Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi. On his part, Mao Zedong endorsed 
both the conference on intellectuals and the science plan because he saw them as 
necessary steps toward a far faster pace of economic development, for which he had 
been advocating against resistance by Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi, and toward 
exercising the party’s political control of science and technology policy via 
planning.89  
 
The making of the science plan in 1955-1956 involved the participation of hundreds 
of Chinese scientists, especially those who had recently returned to China from the 
United States, and dozens of Soviet resident advisors and visiting scientists. Zhou 
Enlai was the overall leader of the effort and he was assisted by a group of mostly 
non-scientist but politically moderate science administrators, with consultation with 
top scientists. Together they came up with two organizing principles for the making 
of the plan. The first one set the strategic objectives of the plan as “select important 
developments and catch up from behind.” It meant that China, given its “backward” 
condition, rapid developments in the world, and the availability of Soviet assistance, 
had to focus on key areas first and take short cuts whenever possible to achieve rapid 
development. Such objectives were to be realized through a second principle 
formulated under the slogan “let the tasks lead disciplines,” which meant that the plan 
would be organized by key, practical state mandates which planned scientific 
advances would serve. This way the organizers came up with a comprehensive list of 
55 “major tasks,” ranging from natural resources to defence technology. Upon protest 
by some scientists, a separate category of basic scientific developments was added to 
the plan (as well as one on scientific information) with Zhou’s endorsement, but the 
overall thrust of the plan was on applied development.90      
 
The 1956 plan had a profound impact on Chinese science and science policy. Perhaps 
the most prominent result of the 1956 plan was the identification of six “emergency 
measures” that China needed to undertake right away both because it was deficient in 
these areas and also because of their newly recognized centrality in modern science 
and technology: atomic energy, rockets, electronics, automation, semiconductors, and 
computers. Institutionally, new research units were soon established, especially within 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences, for these fields with Soviet assistance. The making 
of the plan led to a major step in state-formation with the establishment of the Science 
Planning Commission under Marshall Chen Yi and soon its successor the State 																																																								
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Science and Technology Commission under Marshall Nie Rongzhen who also headed 
the nuclear weapons programs. The Chinese Academy of Sciences also underwent 
dramatic transformation as it moved closer to the national security system and 
engaged in “applied basic research.” Finally, the close Soviet involvement in the 
making of the plan, including a massive effort to review and revise it in Moscow in 
1957, helped facilitate another surge of Soviet technical assistance to China, including 
an agreement on “new defence technologies” (atomic bomb and missiles) and another 
one covering 122 projects.91 In many ways the 1956 plan, whose implementation 
suffered from but survived the Anti-Rightist campaign against intellectual dissidents 
in mid-1957, paved the way for the successes in fission and fusion bombs, missiles, 
and satellites in the next decade and half in China.92 
 
But the plan, which was supposed to enable China to catch up with cutting edge 
science and technology in the world by 1967 also contained in it the spirit of what 
soon became known as the Great Leap Forward, a rash industrialization and 
collectivization drive with devastating consequences for China and its scientific and 
technological developments. Increasingly impatient with what he perceived as the 
Soviet style technocratic approach to economic development advocated by Liu Shaoqi 
and Zhou Enlai, Mao launched the Leap in 1958 after a trip, his second, to the Soviet 
Union.  On November 18, 1957, he declared in Moscow, at an international 
conference of communist party delegations to mark the 40th anniversary of the Soviet 
communist revolution, that “the western world has been outpaced by us,” citing, as 
evidence, the recent launchings of the two Soviet satellites. Before these 
achievements, the socialist camp already boasted a bigger population than the 
capitalists, Mao said, implicitly crediting his own revolution in China in 1949. Now, 
after these launchings, the socialist countries “enjoyed overwhelming advantages in 
the most important scientific and technological sectors” as well. “Comrade 
Khrushchev has told us that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in 
fifteen years,” Mao continued, “I can also tell you that we could catch up or surpass 
Great Britain in fifteen years.”93  
 
What was Mao’s measurement of the China-UK competition? It was expected 
national production of steel. And his basis for confidence? Conversations he had at 
the Moscow conference with Harry Pollitt and John Gollan, leaders of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain, who told him that they expected the output of British steel to 
grow from 20 million tons in 1957 to 30 million tons in fifteen years. By his own 
calculations, Mao believed that China could produce 40 million tons of steel by then 
(its 1957 number was 5.2 million tons).94  
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Upon his return home, Mao, silencing opposition from Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi 
and breaking collective leadership, first made “Catching Britain” through a 
“technological revolution” a national priority. By early 1958, he further launched the 
country into a massive Great Leap Forward movement with a singular focus on steel, 
touching off a nation-wide frenzy of backyard steel making (mostly primitive iron-
making).95 At one point, he believed that China could now actually catch up with 
Britain in two years.96 In science and technology, correspondingly, the objectives of 
the 12 year science plan were predicted to be completed “ahead of schedule” in 1962, 
although in fact many projects and institutions, except for those related to nuclear 
weapons and missiles, were negatively affected by the Leap.97 Soon enough, wasteful 
steel making was joined by forced agricultural collectivization, which together 
brought about one of the worst famines in world history. The Leap also played a role 
in intensifying Sino-Soviet tension to the point that Khrushchev withdrew most Soviet 
specialists from China by 1960.98 
 
By 1962, the reality of the famine and economic difficulties forced the party-state to 
halt the Leap and Mao to make a public “self-criticism” within the party, 
acknowledging that “I don’t know much about industry and business” and that “it 
looks to me impossible to catch up and surpass the most advanced of capitalist 
countries within about one hundred years.”99 Taking advantage of the new 
“readjustment” policy, Marshall Nie Rongzhen presided over the making in 1961 of 
“14 Points,” a liberal party directive on science that sought to rehabilitate scientists 
and other intellectuals politically, improve their working and living conditions, and 
enhance their professional autonomy, including some protection of basic research.100 
The high point in this liberal campaign came in March 1962 when Premier Zhou 
Enlai and Marshal Chen Yi, in Guangzhou at conferences of scientists and 
playwrights, declared that intellectuals were no longer reactionary bourgeois but part 
of the working class. Ominously, however, Mao conspicuously withheld his personal 
approval of the new designation, sowing seeds for a reversal later.101   
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In 1962-1963, Nie reaffirmed the Leap-period claim that the objectives of the 1956 
science plan were largely completed by 1962, but he did so with two caveats. First, 
such specific objectives had been projected for completion by 1962 in the 1956 plan 
in the first place (longer-term objectives were only vague and general)—so the 
achievement was on schedule, not ahead of schedule. Second, even those objectives 
that were completed by 1962 represented only the state of the art of the 1940s, not 
1960s. Thus the 1956 plan, even when completed and even though quite effective in 
many ways, did not achieve the goal of catching up to world standards.102  
 
Nie then supervised the making of a new ten-year (1963-1972) science and 
technology plan in 1962-1963 in coordination with the making of a ten-year national 
economic plan. This time it involved the participation of about 10,000 specialists, and 
its topics included agriculture, industry, resource surveys, medicine and public health, 
technological sciences, and basic sciences. Reflecting the reality of isolation now 
from both the US and the Soviet Union, the plan focused on the need to utilize 
indigenous scientific research in solving practical problems encountered in defence 
and industrial projects. It led to the establishment of intermediate experimentation 
programs to link basic and applied research and product developments.103 In contrast 
to the 1956 plan, however, the 1963 plan did not include defence science and 
technology although it provided for many technological advances, such as laser, that 
would be relevant in this regard. It was no longer aimed to catch up to world 
standards of 1972 but more modestly and vaguely to reach those of the 1960s, which 
it acknowledged may have already been too ambitious.104  
 
On December 16, 1963, Nie briefed Mao and other top leaders on the new science 
plan. Mao expressed his strong support for the plan and for the development of 
science and technology in general as a key to economic progress and thereby fulfilling 
the purpose of the Chinese revolution. He was especially fascinated by the prospect of 
the military applications of laser, directing Nie to organize a group of experts to 
“focus on nothing but this besides their meals.”105 Alas, the plan, though effective in 
some areas, would not be fully implemented because the advent of Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 would disrupt most scientific and technological work except for 
nuclear weapons and other top defence projects. The planning for the latter was put 
under a high-ranking Central Special Commission [zhongyang zhuanwei] headed by 
Zhou Enlai himself, established in November 1962.106 
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Yet, amidst political and ideological tightening on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, 
there were signs that the dramatic revolution in electronics, marked especially by the 
introduction of integrated circuits in the United States in the early 1960s, created 
transnational waves across the Iron Curtain into China. For example, in 1964-1966, 
Chen Boda, one of Mao’s secretaries and a vice president of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, repeatedly called on the academy and others to pay attention to electronic 
technology as a possible engine of a new industrial revolution. Chen said that he had 
been alerted to the importance of electronics from reports out of Japan and East and 
West Germany. “If we develop electronic technology with intension and planning,” 
he declared, “the second industrial revolution could first be realised in China.”107       
 
During the Cultural Revolution, while defence science and technology programs 
received some protection and largely continued, their civilian counterparts faced 
disruption and often catastrophic ruins. The Beijing Botanic Garden of the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, for example, was shut down in 1969 on the ground that 
studying “flowers and grasses” was the doing of reactionary “feudalists, bourgeoisie, 
and revisionists.” Much of its collection of valuable plants and seeds was destroyed or 
lost.108 By the early 1970s, when the worst of the chaos was over, there were efforts 
undertaken by Zhou Enlai and other moderate leaders to resume scientific research 
during another short period of political liberalization. It was against this background 
that a national conference on scientific and technological work was held in Beijing in 
August and September 1972 to discuss, among other agenda items, the making of a 
new long-term scientific and technological plan. The academy, now institutionally 
much reduced, helped organize the conference and set its tone with a major report 
titled “Work on Basic Scientific Theoretical Research Must Be Greatly 
Strengthened.” But the conference and plan-making went nowhere as Mao saw the 
liberalization drive as a rebuke of his Cultural Revolution and turned against its 
advocates Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping.109 
 
Mao’s death and with it the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 marked the 
beginning of the reform era under Deng Xiaoping when economic development was 
given priority and science and technology were held to be key to the Four 
Modernizations (agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology) drive. 
The new science policy pushed Chinese science in general, and the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences in particular, in a utilitarian and applied direction against resistance by 
many of the leading scientists who complained there was too little, not too much, 
emphasis on basic research (even in the academy it counted for only about 15%).110 																																																								
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Thus, even though general political and ideological pressure on scientists and other 
intellectuals was dramatically decreased in the reform era, the tension between the 
state and the scientific elite over basic research continued. And, ironically, reliance on 
foreign, mostly western, science and technology now was, as in the early 1950s with 
the Soviets, used to reduce the perceived importance of indigenous basic research. In 
March 1985, the party leadership issued a formal “Resolution by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Reforms of the Scientific and 
Technological System” which launched a new era of market-driven Chinese science 
and technology policy where dynamics involving basic vs. applied research and self-
reliance vs. foreign influences would both continue and exhibit new forms.111 
 
 
After Comparison 
The science and technology plans in China and India are products of two quite 
distinct historical moments. What are we to gain from looking at them together for the 
history of China and India respectively, and for the history of science and technology 
more broadly? The political scientist and management studies scholar Aqueil Ahmad 
undertook a similar exercise over forty years ago: in terms of availability of archives, 
we don’t seem to have come very far therefrom.112 
 
If the Chinese plan is a product of the early Cold War and bears marked Soviet 
influence, the Indian plan is a product of the early years of Détente which saw India’s 
growing distance from the United States and growing ties with the Soviet Union. The 
language of modernisation was in the making when the Chinese plan was written; 
alongside managerialism, development was the idiom of the times for the Indian plan. 
Indira’s India laid strong claims to socialism but was by then, adept at managing 
international negotiations through the stance of non-alignment. Given the distinct 
contexts and that there is a generational turn over of leadership, it is quite remarkable 
- at the thin level at which they can be compared (the Chinese plan document remains 
mostly closed) - that the two plans are quite similar to each other. 
 
We find that looking at the histories of science and technology planning in India and 
China illuminate, first and foremost, the specific yet overlapping concerns of two 
countries that embarked on the struggle to make the political formation of a nation-
state work for their populations in the middle decades of the twentieth century. We 
also notice that historical actors at all levels in China and India are aware of each 
other and refer to each other.113 Tenuous attempts at sharing and learning from each 
other sometimes meet with success and at other times, not. In this, the two countries 
are not remarkable. What is remarkable is the intensity of effort in the planning 
process, the faith in the practice of science and technology to as a powerful instrument 
of social change, to deliver progress, to retrieve greatness, and the aspiration to shape 																																																																																																																																																														
years of the era of reform and opening up], Kexue wenhua pinglun [science and culture review] 7, no. 6 
(2010): 5-22. 
111 “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu kexue jishu tizhi gaige de jueding” [resolution by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on reforms of the scientific and technological system], in 
Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), Xin shiqi kexue, available from 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66700/4495269.html, accessed in December 2015. 
112 Aqueil Ahmad “Science and Technology in Development: Policy options for India and China” in 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 13, no. 51-52, 23 Dec, 1978; pp. 2079-89. 
113 Arunabh Ghosh, Before 1962: The Case For 1950s Sino-Indian History, unpublished manuscript. 
	 28	
circumstances under which China and India could each claim their “rightful place in 
international politics.” 114 
 
The Indian Science Policy Resolution of 1958 and the Chinese science and 
technology plan of 1956 called for modernization of science, technology, and 
education but the Chinese plan emphasized practical and national defence-related 
high technological developments, while the SPR was a much more philosophical 
statement on science’s cultural and spiritual values as well as its industrial 
applications.  The difference also showed up in the call for urgent implementation of 
the former and the rather slow process in carrying out the latter.115  The process of 
implementing the science and technology plan of 1974-79 might be a more 
appropriate comparison to the Chinese plan. But the archives for this period are only 
just beginning to open. India certainly did not witness the tragedies that befell many 
Chinese scientists who were attacked as enemies of the state for not following closely 
enough the state’s plans in science and technology. That kind of ideological 
coherence, the discipline required to sustain it and international alliances that it 
entailed (or not) was not seen in India. What distinguishes the Indian case most 
significantly for this time period is the studied and restrained policy of non-
Alignment, ironically drawn up in a conversation between Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Zhou Enlai, was followed more rigorously by the India during the Cold War – also in 
negotiating technical assistance. 
 
Alongside the specificities, the two archives renew the discussion on two key 
concepts in twentieth century history of science and technology: “self-reliance” and 
“the linear model.” Self-reliance has globally served as a mobilising concept for 
resources especially since WWII. Its synonyms have been, among others, Swadeshi 
(in India), self-sufficiency, technological self-reliance, technological self-sufficiency, 
economic self-reliance, import substitution, and economic independence (in an 
interdependent world). Its meanings travel from rhetorical claims to isolation, to 
bargaining capability in importing technology. Shades of all of these are found in the 
discussions in China and India.  Each of these is mobilised by different groups around 
the plan to address concerns arising from increasing unemployment of scientists and 
engineers, foreign exchange shortage, drought, war, Cold War geopolitics and foreign 
aid, domestic politics, and the rise of student politics in the 1970s (in the Indian case). 
Self-reliance became an argument that allowed all above named problems to be 
resolved in the managerial or technical realm. Even if the implementation of the 
science and technology plans in both cases was incomplete, the mechanisms of 
problem solving across ministries with institutions created for government oversight 
became standard practice. 
 
Historians of technology have visited, revisited and rescinded “the linear model” on 
several occasions in the last two decades.116 The linear model, briefly put, is a claim 																																																								
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about the useful translation of basic or fundamental research to applied or industrial 
and commercial purposes leading to economic growth: in which basic science begets 
applied science, which begets useful technology. In sum, the claim would be that 
basic or fundamental science is (eventually) foundational to economic growth which 
would justify the funding of scientific research to the largest extent possible in a 
growing economy.  The model has been discredited by historians for 
unproblematically coupling basic science and technology; and to a lesser extent for 
coupling technology with economic growth. Nathan Rosenberg has argued, for 
instance that “technology is not the mechanical “application of science” to 
production; it is a field of knowledge by itself, quite different in its incentives, its 
modes of transmission, and its culture. It is affected by science, but in turn provides 
“pure research” with its instruments and much of its agenda.”117 David Edgerton has 
argued that the model has never quite existed and has gained currency in the much 
later half of the twentieth century.118  
 
Leadership in both China and India claimed and continue to claim that 
“Modernization cannot be imported. It has to grow out of our own soil in order to take 
root. That alone is real transformation.”119 North America and the Soviet Union were 
offered and to a significant extent accepted as the benchmark of development by the 
political leadership in both China and India in the later half of the twentieth century. 
What was that history of Soviet or American modernisation? More often than not, it 
was a narrative of scientific research leading to industrialisation and economic 
growth, seamlessly interconnected. Consider the very first paragraph of the Science 
Policy Resolution:  
 
“The key to national prosperity, apart from the spirit of the 
people, lies, in the modern age, in the effective combination of 
the three factors, technology, raw materials and capital, of 
which the first is perhaps the most important since the creation 
and adoption of new scientific techniques can, in fact, make 
up for a deficiency in natural resources, and reduce the 
demands on capital. But technology can only grow out of the 
study of science and its applications.”120 
 
In the case of Maoist China, especially during times of highly ideological political 
campaigns such as the Anti-Rightist Campaigns, Great Leap Forward, and the 
Cultural Revolution when basic research carried much more political risk than work 
on more applied subjects for scientists. But even Mao and his radical followers 
recognized, as did Joseph Stalin before them, that scientists needed relative freedom 
in defining the relationship between basic and applied research in national security 
and other areas where real achievements were of critical importance to the regime.121  
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For a significant majority of the global population in the twentieth century, the 
relationship between science and technology holds no particular value. If 
modernisation is desired, it is to maintain sovereignty and the integrity of the nation-
state. Many Chinese scientists under persecution in Maoist China or those adversely 
affected by the political chaos in India in the 1970s would accept the primacy of the 
nation-state. Security and development were never separate questions with different 
solutions: it is this experience that we have only begun to explore through a minor and 
incomplete archive in context. 
 
We could only hope for historical studies of the implementation of the two plans to 
allow for a robust comparison – and to draw wider lessons from it. It is telling that 
conclusions drawn more than four decades ago are supported by the limited archive 
available to us even today: “While science in China has evolved out of and for 
production needs, science in India has emerged as a grand abstraction out of the 
“limbo effect” of national development where people, systems, activities could easily 
acquire a ghostlike characteristic of being there without their feet on the ground.”122 
Finally, one may claim that both developmental visions as mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper did, in a way, come true in the twenty first century: India exports skills 
especially in information technology while China has emerged as the manufacturing 
base of the world.  So those first science policy statements were prophetic, after all? 
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